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Annuity contracts typically deliver a stream of income at a predetermined level in order to 
insure against the risk of longevity. This paper explores whether flexible annuities, which 
give subscribers the possibility to choose between different levels for their annuities, may be 
welfare enhancing. In the case where agents gradually discover their actual probability of 
survival, a predetermined and "one-size-fits-all" annuity plan is optimal. If an expenditure risk 
is added along with the longevity risk, a flexible annuity plan is better even though the 
consumption path cannot be isolated from uninsured expenses anymore. 
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This paper has benefited from useful comments by participants of the Paris School of 
Economics workshop “Health and Insurance” and the CESifo Venice Summer Institute 
Workshop on “Longevity and Annuitization”. Any errors or omissions are my own. It is a well established fact that very few assets are converted into life annu-
ities outside of social security and traditional de￿ned bene￿t pension plans. In
the United States for example, 401(k) pension plans are now the dominant form
of private pension. But very few 401(k) plans o⁄er the option to annuitize.
More than 50% of households do not expect to even partly convert their de-
￿ned contribution account balances into an annuity (Brown, 2001). The United
Kingdom has a long history of mandatory annuitization during retirement. In
particular, de￿ned contribution pension funds are currently required to provide
75-year-old retirees with 75 percent of pension assets in the form of annuities.
However, less and less insurers are willing to o⁄er such products. In France,
a voluntary and fully funded personal savings account called PERP has been
recently launched where buyers are compelled to fully annuitize the wealth ac-
cumulated in the plan at the date of retirement. Up to now, this constraint
seems to hinder its commercial extension.
The underinvestment in life annuities contrasts with the bene￿ts such an-
nuities are expected to deliver to retirees. Yaari (1965) shows that full annu-
itization of assets is optimal in a standard model of saving without a bequest
motive. Davido⁄, Brown, and Diamond (2005) show an identical result for a
large set of preferences and environments. A central question is therefore why
the annuity market is so small. A preliminary answer is that even though life
annuities provide unequalled insurance against longevity, they also have partic-
ular disadvantages. Most obviously, the purchaser loses control over his assets,
as most annuity plans deliver a predetermined lifelong income. Hence, once
annuitized, wealth cannot serve to absorb unexpected income shocks, where
most of such shocks for the retirees are health-related. The risk of facing lower
2consumption following a period of unexpected health expenditures is recognized
as being detrimental to the demand of annuities (Brown, 2004). It has also a
signi￿cant impact on saving behavior. For instance, several articles argue that
the existence of out-of-pocket medical expense risk explains why the elderly run
down their assets so slowly (Palumbo 1999, De Nardi et al. 2006)
At ￿rst sight, this drawback could be minimized by providing the annuitant
with some ￿ exibility over the annuity pro￿le. A ￿ exible contract can be de￿ned
as a contract that gives the annuitant the possibility to withdraw a higher an-
nuity in case of an expenses shock. The absence of such an option in existing
contracts is commonly justi￿ed by an argument of adverse selection as stressed
by Brown and Warshawsky (2001, p.14): "Insurance companies do not allow
individuals to cancel an annuity agreement once it is in place. Otherwise ad-
verse selection would obviously occur as individuals acquire information about
their expected longevity." If individuals update their actual chance of longevity,
annuitants who expect to live longer would indeed like to increase their ￿nan-
cial stake in the plan while the shorter-lived consumers would like to consume
greater amounts earlier, thereby reducing their annuitized wealth. If the in-
surer gives the subscribers the ￿ exibility to choose between di⁄erent levels at
which they consume their annuity, the expected return of a pool of saving can
be greatly reduced by an adverse shift in the composition of the population of
subscribers. At the extreme limit, if agents were always informed su¢ ciently
in advance of the day they die, they would have the time to close their per-
sonal account, thereby escaping the redistribution scheme. This would cause
the collapse of the longevity insurance mechanism.
The objective of this paper is to explore this issue in depth and to ask
3whether the adverse selection argument in itself prevents any ￿ exibility in an-
nuity plans from being feasible. I begin by presenting a simple model where
life expectancy is the only source of uncertainty. Agents update their mortality
risk during the retirement phase. This raises the question whether they should
modify the level of their annuity according to their more precise estimate of
mortality. It is shown that in this simple model, they should not. A ￿xed an-
nuity plan which provides a predetermined stream of annuities independent of
future information about longevity is optimal because it prevents annuitants to
draw their wealth down in case of bad news about their mortality. This is a
clear case where ￿ exible life annuities are not welfare enhancing in line with the
argument stressed by Brown and Warshawsky (2001).
Next, the previous model is extended by including a liquidity risk in addition
to the longevity risk. Some savers face a liquidity need due to adverse shocks
to their health. Some ￿ exibility through a choice between di⁄erent levels of
annuities then becomes optimal. However, the risk of increased expenses cannot
be fully insured, due to the adverse selection mechanism just outlined.
The main result of the analysis is that adverse selection per se does not justify
the complete absence of ￿ exibility. The choice of raising an annuity during one
period up to a limit may cover some additional expenses, and thereby provide
insurance. Flexibility is then optimal, even though a reduction in the rate of
return arises due to adverse selection. This result is important, given the general
lack of annuitization observed in most developed countries. Indeed, a minimal
degree of ￿ exibility may reduce the mismatch between the desired consumption
path and the annuity income stream, thereby promoting wealth annuitization.
The literature on the annuity market has developed rapidly for two decades.
4Most of the studies focus on the "annuity puzzle" by examining why households
do not buy more annuity contracts when they retire. The studies generally
assume an exogenous annuity stream and examine which type of consumers￿
preferences or which market imperfections allow to explain why the theoretical
prediction of full annuitization (Yaari, 1965) does not seem to hold empiri-
cally (e.g. Kotliko⁄ and Spivak 1981, Walliser 1999, Milevsky and Young 2002,
Davido⁄, Brown, and Diamond 2005). Those articles di⁄er in perspective from
the present work by taking the annuity stream o⁄ered by the insurer as given.
In contrast, the annuity plan is endogenous here in the sense that its optimal
design depends on the presence of various types of uncertainty.
The issue addressed by the present article is formally close to Brugiavini
(1993). He studies at which stage of their life individuals should purchase annu-
ities given that they learn about their survival probability as they get older. His
model predicts a purchase in an early stage of the life cycle. The present model
displays similar implications if the period during which individuals update their
survival probability is reinterpreted as a retirement period instead of an early
working period. However, a di⁄erent question is addressed in the two papers.
His paper asks whether workers should buy an annuity contract at an early stage
of their life and if they do, whether they could recontract when they retire. She
￿nds that workers could not purchase more annuities later in life since it would
reveal a high risk for insurers. In the present model, the early purchase of a
￿xed annuity works as a commitment device that prevents savers to consume
more in case of bad news about their longevity. A formal connection between
the two setups is explored further at the end of Section 2.
In section 1 a simple model of annuity demand when longevity is uncertain
5is introduced. The basic argument of why a ￿xed annuity plan may be optimal
is provided. Section 2 incorporates a liquidity shock and studies to what extent
this additional source of uncertainty may be optimally insured by a ￿ exible
annuity plan. The last section concludes.
1 A model with uncertainty about longevity
In this section, a formal case against ￿ exible annuities is presented in a basic
setting with a longevity risk only. Subscribers are not allowed to choose their
annuity pro￿le on a period by period basis. This case will serve as a benchmark
model when a second source of uncertainty will be introduced in the next section.
Consider an environment where agents allocate their wealth w between con-
sumption at two dates t = 1;2. The gross interest rate of the economy is denoted
by R. Life expectancy is uncertain so that individuals face a probability to die
before their last period consumption. The uncertainty of survival calls for the
purchase of annuities which pay at a premium when alive in exchange for the
subscribers￿wealth upon death. In the absence of a bequest motive or unin-
surable risk, full annuitization prevails (Yaari, 1965). The role of the insurer
is to pool individuals with similar longevity expectations but varying longevity
outcomes as a means to protect them against the longevity risk.
In the model, uncertainty about the mortality risk gradually resolves itself
between a preliminary date 0 and date 1. Individuals have the same life ex-
pectancy at t = 0. At t = 1, they obtain more precise information about their
actual probability to survive the last period t = 2. A fraction p of annuitants
learn that their probability to survive is ￿h. The remaining annuitants are char-
acterized by a lower survival probability ￿l < ￿h. cti denotes consumption at
6date t = 1;2 of agents with the longevity type i = h;l. Utility of consumption
per period is denoted u(c), with u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0 and limu0(c) = 1 when
c ! 0. Intertemporal utility is additive and ￿ is the subjective discount rate
attached to the last period utility:
v(c1i;c2i;￿i) = u(c1i) + ￿i￿u(c2i)
Information about longevity is private. Hence, insurers are unable to sep-
arate the annuitants by risk classes. Insurance ￿rms cannot monitor whether
costumers hold annuities also from other ￿rms. They compete by o⁄ering the
most attractive rate of return for saving. Individuals can purchase as many an-
nuities as they want at the prevailing rate of return. This leads to the de￿nition
of an asymmetric information equilibrium (e.g. Abel, 1986) characterized by
the annuity plan f(b c1i;b c2i);i = h;lg which satis￿es:
(i) (b c1i;b c2i) = arg
￿
maxv(c1i;c2i;￿i)
s.t. c1i + ￿c2i=R = w
￿
i = h;l (1)
(ii) ￿ =
pb c2h
pb c2h + (1 ￿ p)b c2l
￿h +
(1 ￿ p)b c2l
pb c2h + (1 ￿ p)b c2l
￿l
Insurers provide annuitants with the highest actuarially feasible rate of re-
turn R=￿. This rate takes as given the average mortality risk ￿, weighted by the
participation rate of each type in the annuity plan. Given this rate of return,
consumers choose the best annuity pro￿le according to the above de￿nition.
Now, assume that the consumers have the possibility to sign a binding con-
tract at date 0 at a time when they have not yet updated their information
about their longevity. They leave their saving to the insurers, which maximizes
their date 0 expected utility stream:
￿
maxpv(c1h;c2h;￿h) + (1 ￿ p)v(c1l;c2l;￿l)
s.t. p(w ￿ c1h ￿ ￿hc2h=R) + (1 ￿ p)(w ￿ c1l ￿ ￿lc2l=R) = 0 (2)
7The resulting consumption path f(c￿
1i;c￿




tl t = 1;2
u0(c1i) = ￿Ru0(c2i) i = 1;2 (3)
The allocation is Pareto optimal since information is symmetric at date 0.
It equalizes consumption across risks and makes the consumption path indepen-
dent of the mortality risk.
In this equilibrium, insurers compete for savings as soon as date 0 by promis-
ing an annuity sequence f(c￿
1i;c￿
2i);i = h;lg. It remains to see whether individ-
uals are willing to immediately buy such a contract or prefer to postpone their
consumption decision. Indeed, even though this contract is optimal from an ex
ante perspective, this is obviously not a contract that retirees would buy at date
1 once their individual longevity is better assessed. Proposition 1 states that
the date 0 expected utility associated with buying the ex ante optimal contract
is higher than the expected utility derived from postponing the consumption
decision (proof in Appendix):
Proposition 1. pv(c￿
1h;c￿
2h;￿h) + (1 ￿ p)v(c￿
1l;c￿
2l;￿l) > pv(b c1h;b c2h;￿h) +
(1 ￿ p)v(b c1l;b c2l;￿l).
There is a basic intuition behind this result, ￿rst outlined by Hirshleifer
(1971). The reduction of uncertainty at date 1 prevents any transfer from the
low risk agents to the high risk agents, which undermines the insurance scheme.
Proposition 1 is a clear case against ￿ exible life annuities since it establishes
the superior e¢ ciency of an unconditional annuity plan that delivers a single
level of annuity at dates 1 and 2. By not providing agents with the possibility
8to receive a higher annuity in case of a bad signal about their longevity, a ￿xed
saving plan preserves a higher rate of return, and allows to mutualize the risk
of longevity more e¢ ciently.
Even though it is optimal to buy a predetermined annuity plan at date 0
according to proposition 1, it remains to check that agents cannot improve their
situation by recontracting at date 1 by buying or selling new annuities. Let us
denote by bi the additional amount of annuities that they buy (or sell short)
at time 1 for the last period consumption. Because they have invested all their
saving at date 0 in the predetermined annuity plan, they use the payment c￿
1 to
consume and save at date 1: e c1i + bi = c￿
1 so that their last date consumption
if alive is e c2i = c￿
2 + Rbi=￿i. The rate of return is adjusted to each speci￿c risk
since buying new annuities reveals a low risk and short selling reveals a high
risk1. Hence, the revised consumption plan is determined by:
￿
maxv(c1i;c2i;￿i)





and does not deviate from the ex ante optimal allocation, which means that
bi = 0. This sums up the argument put forth by Brugiavini (1993). Agents
do not recontract later since the e⁄ect of new information about longevity on
consumption is exactly o⁄set by the revision of the actuarially fair interest rate.
This section has shown the optimality of a ￿xed annuity plan. The next
section adds uninsurable expenses, which leads to a di⁄erent result.
1Short selling could be ruled out without changing the revelation mechanism outlined.
92 Adding uninsurable expense shocks
The previous framework is preserved except that some uninsurable expenses,
possibly related to health, may be incurred at date 1. There are now three
sorts of consumers who discover their type at date 1. The ￿rst one, represented
in proportion p, is a long-lived consumer who survives date 2 with probability
￿ > 0. Such agents are denoted as of type h below. Agents of a second type
m are represented with a proportion q and also survive with probability ￿, but
incur an additional cost m > 0 at date 1. This cost is interpreted as an out-of-
pocket medical expenditure. Last, type l agents, in proportion s = 1 ￿ p ￿ q,
are short-lived consumers who die with certainty at the end of period 1.
Insurers o⁄er an annuity plan at date 0, at a time when agents do not
know their type and some insurance is still possible. An optimal plan is a
set of annuities f(c1h;c2h); (c1m;c2m); (c1l;0)g dedicated to types h, m and l
respectively.
It is informative to start the analysis with the hypothesis of complete infor-
mation, where the three types are publicly known at date 1. Annuity contracts
can be tailored to each type and full insurance between the insured prevails:
c￿
1h = c￿
1m ￿ m = c￿
1l and c￿
2h = c￿
2m. The risk of longevity and the expense
shock are perfectly mutualized across agents. Moreover, consumption evolves
in accordance with the ￿rst best allocation: u0(c￿
1i) = ￿Ru0(c￿
2i), i = h;l.
In the more realistic case in which an agent￿ s type is private information,
the insurer has to make sure that each annuity plan is chosen by the type
for whom it is designed. A ￿rst constraint checks that type h agents actually
choose the annuity plan (c1h;c2h) instead of (c1m;c2m) designed for type m
individuals. This happens if the ￿rst type does not achieve a higher utility by
10selecting the annuity c1m, saving the amount x = c1m￿c1h and then consuming
c2h = c2m + xR=￿ in the last period. The possibility to switch to a di⁄erent
annuity pro￿le leads to a reservation level of utility denoted by vh:
vh(z) = fmaxu(c1) + ￿￿u(c2);c1 + c2￿=R = zg (4)
where z = c1m+￿c2m=R is the intertemporal value of the annuity plan (c1m;c2m).
The incentive compatibility constraint is then:
u(c1h) + ￿￿u(c2h) ￿ vh(z) (5)
Note that a ￿rst best policy with full information consists of a redistribution
of resources to the agents who incur the expense shock because c1h = c1m ￿
m < c1m and c2h = c2m. When the type is private information, the insurer
is constrained to give the same actuarial value to both types (see the resource
constraint in (4)). For the same reason, the reverse constraint in which a type
m would prefer (c1h;c2h) to (c1m;c2m) is not operative in equilibrium as the
insurance scheme implies transferring more resources to type m, not less.
A second incentive compatibility constraint recognizes that type l agents
always choose the highest annuity available at date 1. It follows that the annuity
c1l cannot be less than the same period annuity designed for long-lived agents:
c1l ￿ max(c1h;c1m).
An equilibrium set of contracts maximizes the consumers￿expected utility




maxp(u(c1h) + ￿￿u(c2h)) + q(u(c1m ￿ m) + ￿￿u(c2m)) + su(c1l)
s.t.
p(c1h + ￿c2h=R) + q(c1m + ￿c2m=R) + sc1l = w
u(c1h) + ￿￿u(c2h) ￿ vh(z)
c1l ￿ max(c1h;c1m)
(6)
11It is straightforward to show that c1m ￿ c1h in equilibrium. If this were not
the case, the insurer could marginally reduce the date 1 consumption of type
1 and increase the consumption of type 2 by a factor p=q yielding a net utility
increase of u0(c1m￿m)￿u0(c1h) > 0. Hence, it follows that the last information
constraint simpli￿es to
c1l ￿ c1m (7)




maxp(u(c1h(z)) + ￿￿u(c2h(z))) + q(u(c1m ￿ m) + ￿￿u(c2m)) + su(c1l)
s.t.
(1 ￿ s)(c1m + ￿c2m=R) + sc1l = w
c1l ￿ c1m
where c1h(z) and c2h(z) are agents￿optimal demands of annuities solving (4).
The second constraint merges with the budget constraint of (4) into the broader
budget constraint of the insurer in (6). We can next examine the consequences
for the optimal annuity plan.
Proposition 2. The incentive compatibility constraint (7) is binding: c1l =
c1m.
The basic reason behind this inequality is that an expense shock is a legit-
imate reason to let the saver withdraw a higher annuity whereas a bad signal
about survival is not. As a result, the insurer would like to o⁄er a smaller an-
nuity to a type l compared to the one proposed to a type m. As distinguishing
between the two types is impossible, the insurer is compelled to o⁄er a single
annuity level for both types.
12A natural question that arises is whether the annuitants su⁄ering an expense
shock bene￿t at all from an insurance mechanism, given the adverse selection
mechanism discussed in the introduction. The following proposition gives a
positive answer:
Proposition 3. c1m > c1h.
This proposition shows that individuals can rely on a higher annuity when
they must meet additional expenditures. This option comes at the cost of a
diminished annuity in the last period since the information constraint (5) binds.
Proposition 3 addresses to what extent this increases the insurance mechanism.
Proposition 4. The annuity plan (c1m;c2m) satis￿es u0(c1m￿m) > R￿u0(c2m).
This proposition shows that annuitants who experience an expense shock
cannot withdraw a su¢ ciently high annuity in order to fully smooth their con-
sumption pro￿le compared to the ￿rst best environment. Indeed, the insurer is
prevented from raising the annuity because it magni￿es the adverse selection ef-
fect and undermines the longevity insurance mechanism as previously discussed.
On the contrary, perfect consumption smoothing could be restored if the adverse
selection e⁄ect were absent:
Proposition 5. If s = 0, u0(c1m ￿ m) = R￿u0(c2m).
To sum up, the insurer proposes three annuity plans f(c1h;c2h); (c1m;c2m);
13(c1l;0)g, one for each type. A certain degree of ￿ exibility is optimal, as agents
are free to choose between consuming a high annuity c1m and a low one c1h.
Choosing the high annuity reduces the last period income but improves the
well-being of the agents who face an expense shock at date 1. Short-lived agents
choose to "close" their annuity plan by choosing the high level c1l > c1h as well.
However, they face a high penalty as they cannot consume more than the level
of the annuity that agents with an expense shock are allowed to withdraw. This
penalty is optimal as it limits the scope of the adverse selection e⁄ect. Since
insurers do not allow short-lived agents to deplete their account at date 1, agents
in need of additional income cannot fully smooth their consumption pro￿le.
3 Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal annuity contract when agents face a liquidity
risk and a longevity risk. Simultaneously analyzing the e⁄ects of both types of
risk is relevant. Taken separately, they produce con￿ icting predictions about the
characteristics of the contract. With both types of risk, ￿ exible annuities which
provide annuitants with the possibility to choose between di⁄erent withdrawal
levels are welfare enhancing as they allow agents su⁄ering the expense shock to
better smooth their consumption path.
It is worth noting that ￿ exibility does not mean total freedom for the annu-
itants. Indeed, the high pay-out level cannot be raised too much, as it leads the
short-lived individuals to consume too much, thereby undermining the longevity
insurance scheme. This constraint prevents agents su⁄ering the expense shock
from perfectly smoothing their consumption pro￿le.
The main result of the paper is that the adverse selection e⁄ect sometimes
14cited against ￿ exible annuities is not su¢ cient for the optimality of a ￿xed and
"one size ￿ts all" annuity scheme. The option to increase withdrawals in one
period up to a limited level may achieve a good deal of consumption smoothing
while limiting the size of the rate of return reduction due to the adverse selection
e⁄ect. A practical conclusion is that a minimal degree of ￿ exibility could well
promote wealth annuitization by reducing the mismatch between the desired
consumption path and the annuity income stream.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By way of comparison, the date 0 problem in (2)




maxpv(c1h;c2h;￿h) + (1 ￿ p)v(c1l;c2l;￿l)






This program closely resembles the ex post problem with asymmetric infor-
mation de￿ned in (1):
(i) f(b c1i;b c2i);i = h;lg = arg
￿
maxpv(c1h;c2h;￿h) + (1 ￿ p)v(c1l;c2l;￿l)




pb c2h + (1 ￿ p)b c2l
￿h +
(1 ￿ p)b c2l
pb c2h + (1 ￿ p)b c2l
￿l
16except that the budget constraint is now split into two separate constraints
instead of one and that the impact of the consumption choice on the rate of
return R=￿ is not internalized. Hence, despite the objective being the same, the
ex post problem includes additional constraints. As a result, it delivers a less
e¢ cient consumption stream from the the perspective of date 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
If c1l 6= c1m, the program of the insurer is:
￿
maxp(u(c1h(z)) + ￿￿u(c2h(z))) + q(u(c1m ￿ m) + ￿￿u(c2m)) + su(c1l)
s.t. (p + q)(c1m + ￿c2m=R) + sc1l = w
Forming the Lagrangian function:
L(c1m;c2m;c1l) = p(u(c1h(z)) + ￿￿u(c2h(z))) + q(u(c1m ￿ m) + ￿￿u(c2m)) + su(c1l)
+￿[w ￿ (p + q)(c1m + ￿c2m=R) ￿ sc1l]









] + qu0(c1m ￿ m) ￿ (p + q)￿ = 0
@L
@c1l
= su0(c1l) ￿ s￿ = 0










































u0(c1m) = u0(c1m) (iii)
Equality (i) is obtained by using the Euler equation u0(c1h) = ￿Ru0(c2h)
derived from (4), (ii) by di⁄erentiating the budget constraint (4): c1h(z) +
17c2h(z)￿=R = z and substituting for @c1h=@z. Inequality (iii) exploits the fact
that c1m ￿ c1h at equilibrium. The result is that c1l ￿ c1m or c1l = c1m when
the information constraint (7) is taken into account.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let us prove that c1m = c1h cannot hold at the equilibrium. This implies
c2m = c2h from (4). The insurer￿ s program with c1h = c1m = c1l is then:
￿
max(1 ￿ q)u(c1m) + qu(c1m ￿ m) + (1 ￿ s)￿￿u(c2m)
s.t. c1m + (1 ￿ s)c2m￿=R = w
Forming the Lagrangian function and setting the partial derivatives to zero
leads to the Euler equation: (1￿q)u0(c1m)+qu0(c1m￿m) = R￿u0(c2m). Hence
u0(c1m) < R￿u0(c2m). But c1m = c1h also implies c2m = c2h and u0(c1m) =
R￿u0(c2m) from (4), which contradicts the former equation.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The insurer￿ s program with c1l = c1m is:
￿
maxp(u(c1h(z)) + ￿￿u(c2h(z))) + q(u(c1m ￿ m) + ￿￿u(c2m)) + su(c1m)
s.t. c1m + (1 ￿ s)c2m￿=R = w
















































+ qu0(c1m ￿ m) + su0(c1m)
18Using u0(c1h) = R￿u0(c2h):
q
1 ￿ s
























Di⁄erentiating c1h(z)+c2h(z)￿=R = z and substituting for @c1h=@z leads to
the constrained Euler equation:














= (1 ￿ s)u0(c1m ￿ m) + su0(c1h)
￿ (1 ￿ s)u0(c1m ￿ m) + su0(c1m ￿ m) (ii)
= u0(c1m ￿ m)
Inequality (i) uses the fact that c1m > c1h and (ii) c1m ￿ m ￿ c1h. Indeed,
c1m ￿ m > c1h would lead to over-insurance. In this case, u0(c1m ￿ m) <
u0(c1h) = R￿u0(c2h). Moreover, c1m > c1h implies c2m < c2h from (4) and
therefore R￿u0(c2m) > R￿u0(c2h) implying u0(c1m ￿ m) < R￿u0(c2m). That
is, type m agents consume too much at date 1 despite additional expenses. It
follows that insurers could improve the position of type m by reducing c1m and
raising c2m without violating the type m resource constraint c1m+￿c2m=R = w
and incentive compatibility constraints.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Take the constrained Euler equation (8) found in the previous proof and
set s = 0 and p + q = 1.
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